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American States and Indian Tribes:
Power Conflicts in the Supreme Court
Daniel L. Rotenberg*
I. Introduction
Within the broad framework of United States sovereignty, two
types of entities exercising limited sovereignty, states and Indian
tribes, vie for power. Each group is subject to different constraints.
The states are guided and controlled by the Constitution and Con-
gress, with the law of both filtered through the United States Su-
preme Court. The tribes, on the other hand, are not subject to the
Constitution.' Their limitations come from Congress, again of
course, as interpreted by the Court. In addition, the Court also exer-
cises an independent, undefined power over the tribes.2
A jurisdictional dispute between a state and a tribe may be even
more complex than a state-federal or a state-state dispute. For ex-
ample, consider the simple situation in which a state court wishes to
exercise jurisdiction over a dispute that occurs on an Indian reserva-
tion between an Indian and a non-Indian. The court may be unsure
whether to use state or tribal substantive law. Part of the complexity
of the problem can be attributed to the fact that whereas the term
"state" denotes both a governmental power and its geographic area,
"tribe" and "reservation"" are not coextensive.
* Professor of Law, University of Houston.
I. None of the rights or limitations in the Constitution expressly relates to Indians,
tribes, or tribal governments. Indians are mentioned in the Constitution in only two contexts.
One is in art. I, § 2, which excludes "Indians not taxed" from being counted in determining
the number of persons within a state for the purpose of ascertaining the number of representa-
tives each state is to have in the House. This restriction is repeated as a carryover in the
fourteenth amendment, § 2. The second mention is in the commerce clause, art 1, § 8, which
gives Congress power to regulate commerce "with the Indian Tribes."
2. Even with the Constitution inapplicable and Congress silent, the Court applies law to
the Indian tribes. The source of this law remains unclear even today.
3. "Tribe" does not have a single meaning. Generally it is a membership group but who
the members are depends on who is making the decision. The tribe itself makes the choice for
internal purposes; Congress decides in legislation; and the Court decides for its purposes.
Often, however, no operative definition is used. The Supreme Court offered a meaning in 1901:
"By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a
community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes
ill-defined territory... . Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). A few years
ago a court of appeals refused to adopt a "true" meaning, and instead opted for a flexible
approach. It commented on the federal administrative meaning: "The Department of Interior
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Moreover, what makes the state-tribe confrontation unusually
slippery to analyze is its unique and unreal legal status. On the one
hand, Congress with its plenary power over the tribes and its almost
plenary power over the states can legislate solutions-but it can also
legislate the tribes out of existence.' On the other hand, so long as
Congress withholds legislation and its awesome power over the
tribes, the disputes remain. Their resolution falls into the hands of
the Supreme Court. Are such disputes for the Court of constitutional
dimension? How can they be when one party, the tribe, is not sub-
ject to the Constitution? One could answer by saying that the Court
has constitutional substantive power to invoke international law. It
seems odd, however, that international substantive rules should be
used to resolve disputes between two domestic, limited sovereigns,
both of which are at all times subject to the virtually total power of
Congress. Presumably what the Court really does is to create and
apply federal common law as it has done for state-state litigation;6 or
perhaps, more accurately, it uses both the Constitution and common
law for the states and common law, or perhaps one should say "un-
common" law for the tribes.
The purpose of this Article is to examine state-tribe conflicts in
the absence of congressional action, in order to ascertain and evalu-
ate the Supreme Court's current method and logic in allocating
power among these long-time jurisdictional competitors.
has not historically spent much effort deciding whether particular groups of people are Indian
tribes . . . . [It) has never formally passed on the tribal status of . . . any . . . group [of
Indians] whose status was disputed." Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575,
581 (Ist Cir. 1979).
4. Indian tribal land derives from several sources. If it existed before the United States
began negotiations and decision-making that affected it, it is called "aboriginal." Usually the
area has been created by Congress and is a "legislative reservation." Some reservations, how-
ever, have been created by the President and are called "executive reservations." Some areas
were recognized by Mexico before they came under United States' authority; thus, they are
neither aboriginal nor reservation. The rancheria and pueblo are examples.
5. Congress tried to do this with the Indian General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The idea was to divide Indian
lands among individual Indians for the purpose of having them assimilate into the main cul-
ture. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 650 n.I (1976). This policy
was reversed in 1934. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970)). For discussion, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the In-
dian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 959-60 (1972).
6. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-97 (1907).
7. Constitutional minimum standards such as due process and equal protection are ap-
plied to the states; beyond them, however, other law must be used to resolve state-tribe
disputes.
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II. Analytic Framework
The Supreme Court can draw upon several legal approaches in
resolving state-tribe conflicts. The constitutional concept of substan-
tive due process in a potential doctrine of limitation on the states,
but not the tribes.5 This analytic tool, however, has rarely been used
or even discussed by the Court. A recent exception is a separate
opinion by Justice Stevens in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker in which he observes that state fuel use and license taxes
imposed on a non-Indian logging company operating on an Indian
reservation might be invalid under due process if the state had no
"governmental interest . . . in imposing such a burden."' 0 A second
doctrine, "equitable apportionment," used in state-state conflicts
over limited natural resources, has been explicitly held by the Court
to be inapplicable to state-tribe controversies over scarce water allo-
cations." One seeming inconsistency in which it has been applied to
a state-tribe controversy is Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn.1 -
a dispute which concerned Indian tribal rights to "take" fish. The
Court, faced with a purported treaty interpretation issue, was forced
to go beyond mere interpretation and construed the treaty to include
the notion of equitable apportionment in order to allow the Indians
no more than 50% and assure the non-Indians no less than 50% of
the fish run. Because the doctrine transcended the treaty terms and
was a construct used to achieve fairness, its use for the same purpose
where no treaty or law exists seems afortiori appropriate in the nat-
ural resources context.
Another limitation arguably relevant to some state-tribe dis-
putes is based on the negative implications of both the interstate and
the Indian commerce clauses. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe,'" oil and gas producers argued that a tribal severance tax vio-
lated the interstate clause. After "assum[ing]"'14 the applicability of
the clause, the Court demonstrated that the tax did not violate it.
8. The combination of the fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
subjects both federal and state governments and their subdivisions to due process require-
ments. Indian tribal governments are not included and, although the argument has been made
to the contrary, See, e.g., Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 51
(W.D.N.Y. 1972), tribes are not considered federal instrumentalities or extensions of the fed-
eral government.
9. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
10. Id. at 158 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
II. Arizona v. California. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
12. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
13. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
14. Id. at 154.
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The Court, however, never conceded that the clause was truly rele-
vant. It recognized that "reviewing tribal action under the [clause] is
not without conceptual difficulties."'" A major difficulty is that the
interstate clause is a power allocation between state and federal gov-
ernments. It does not address Indian tribes at all. Similarly, the In-
dian commerce clause is a grant of power to the federal government.
It is not a limitation on the tribes, because when the Constitution
was written and adopted in was not made applicable to the Indian
nations.' The original methods under the Constitution for limiting
tribal power were by treaty or war. Only much later did the com-
merce power enter the picture. 7 Although the clause is now a basis
for congressional power over Indians, the Court, presumably, is not
ready to go further and use the clause by itself as a limitation on
Indian power.
The two doctrines used most often by the Court to resolve state-
tribe conflicts are sovereignty and preemption. The remainder of this
Article focuses on these two independent yet related approaches. Al-
though some observers may consider Indian sovereignty an anachro-
nism, it is not viewed that way by either the tribes or the Supreme
Court. Notwithstanding its limited and defeasible quality, sover-
eignty was and still is a usable idea-both as a source of power and
as a gauge for determining the scope of power. Competing with it is
the much younger preemption analysis. Although preemption is a
well-known concept, it has a special meaning when applied to state-
Indian affairs.
III. Sovereignty
Given that both states and tribes are, to some degree, sovereign,
how does sovereignty serve as a clarifying tool for resolving disputes
between the two? The answer apparent from the cases is that only
Indian sovereignty is instrumental. Why this is so is not stated in the
opinions but the reason may be tied to two recurring factors in the
cases: first, state power is assumed to be valid and applicable; sec-
ond, the fact situations occur on Indian territory' s and have either a
15. Id. at 153.
16. This point is elaborated upon in Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death-A
Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409 (1986).
17. After United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), Congress could govern with-
out regard to treaty or tribal consent. A congressional power source was difficult to find. Inher-
ent power, power based on the property clause of the Constitution, power inferred from the
Indians' dependant status-all were used. Finally, the commerce clause emerged as the single
best source. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
18. Because tribes are membership groups with sovereign powers, it is theoretically pos-
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direct or indirect effect on the tribe. With the first point not in dis-
pute and the second obviously raising tribal concerns, the Court's
natural focus would be on tribal power-the one variable that is both
only partially developed and of special importance because of the
Court's fiduciary-type duty toward the tribes. It seems not to matter
whether the question is the validity of a state law when applied to a
reservation event or the priority of state or Indian law when both
purport to govern the same on-reservation facts or simply the valid-
ity of Indian authority over the event. The analysis is the same for
each situation.
A. The Evolution of Indian Sovereignty
The idea of pure or unlimited sovereignty includes absolute po-
litical power over an identifiable territory. From the beginning of the
European presence in America, however, Indian sovereignty ac-
quired a peculiar meaning. The European "right of discovery," '19 as
applied to New World findings, was interpreted so that although the
Indians were considered the owners of their land, they could not con-
vey it to anyone except the "discovering" nation.2 0 A second limita-
tion, less well known and certainly less of a legal problem in reality,
was the idea that the tribes were not free to enter into international
alliances."1
Notwithstanding these restrictions, the tribes were considered
sovereign both at law and in fact. In the early Georgia cases, Chero-
kee Nation2" and Worcester v. Georgia2" Chief Justice Marshall
gave Indian sovereignty the Supreme Court's imprimatur. Not only
sible that some of them might try to assert the application of their laws to members wherever
situated; e.g., within the confines of a state. In other words, they might claim their jurisdiction
is universal rather than territorial. In fact, however, the tribes are not trying to control events
occurring off the reservation or beyond their territory.
19. This doctrine was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) and reaffirmed in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
543-44 (1832).
20. A European nation that "discovered" land being occupied by Indians was stymied. It
could not validly discover land that has already been discovered and it could not obtain con-
veyance from the Indians because they did not claim ownership in the sense that they could
transfer it. The new European doctrine gave the Indians the power to transfer but, conve-
niently, only to the particular "discovering" nation. This is a simplified version that is not
completely correct. Some tribes did hold land in the same way European countries did. Appar-
ently land was held in so many different ways that generalizing is not possible. Nevertheless,
tribes that thought of land as a common resource available to all might not have had authority
to convey except that the European recipient and its colleagues took the conveyance anyway
and in this sense gave the power to the tribes.
21. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
22. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
23. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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was the anomalous status of the tribes retained, it was expanded.
The Chief Justice explained that on the one hand, the tribes were
"nations," 2" but on the other hand, they were "domestic depen-
dent" 5 and their relationship to the national government "resembles
that of a ward to his guardian."26 The conclusion that tribes were
simultaneously sovereign nations and helpless incompetents gave the
Indians, some might contend, the best of both worlds. Future courts,
however, were free to stress one extreme or the other,27 or a host of
intermediate options. Until 1871 the United States consistently used
its treaty power, an obvious acknowledgement of Indian sovereignty,
when it resolved Indian disputes through legal process. In that year,
however, the House of Representatives, disgruntled with having to
appropriate money to finance obligations incurred by the Senate and
the President in numerous treaties with the Indians, managed to at-
tach a rider to an appropriation bill that became law. It provided:
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may con-
tract by treaty .... "I
Although the Supreme Court has never decided the constitu-
tionality of this restriction on the treaty power, no further treaties
have been made with the Indians. A ready substitute for the treaty
approach was the congressional or executive agreement; that is, an
agreement by.the tribe and a representative of either the Congress or
the President subsequently ratified by both houses and the President.
This technique preserved Indian sovereignty and satisfied the desire
of the House for a say in the agreement process.2 9
In 1886 however, in the case of United States v. Kagama,30 the
Supreme Court seemed to put an end to Indian sovereignty."2 It de-
termined that Congress had the power to regulate Indian affairs not
24. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. In the Supreme Court the emphasis has varied from the extreme "ward" approach
of a case like United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) to the extreme "sovereignty"
view of Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
28. 25 U.S.C. 71 (1970).
29. On occasion a post-1871 ratified agreement will be called a treaty. For example, see
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977).
30. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
31. The premise of this Article is that Indian sovereignty will not be resurrected and
that the legal status quo will remain. I have elsewhere suggested the possibility that Indian
sovereignty could be reinstated. Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death-A Centennial Re-
membrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. RE V. 409 (1986).
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only through the treaty process and the agreement process that had
taken its place, but also under delegated and even undelegated pow-
ers that did not call for Indian consent . 2 Nowhere in the opinion
does the Court address the critical issue: How can Congress apply its
laws to tribes that until that time had not been subject under the
Constitution to its legislative jurisdiction? Nevertheless, the blood-
less revolution was accomplished. Thereafter, Congress ruled unilat-
erally. Incredibly, however, sovereignty survived. It was now a sover-
eignty-at-will. Today this unique sovereignty is still alive. For
example, in the 1970's the Supreme Court recognized the tribes'
freedom from suit in federal court under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity;s8 held that double jeopardy is not applicable to successive
criminal prosecutions by tribal and federal governments because
each is a separate sovereignty;, ' and upheld a questionably broad
delegation of congressional authority to tribes because of their sover-
eign status.8 5
B. Sovereignty Now
With Indian sovereignty firmly established, current Supreme
Court cases that use it as their analytic method come into focus. The
leading case is Williams v. Lee. 6 A non-Indian who operated a gen-
eral store on a reservation in Arizona sued an Indian couple in an
Arizona court to collect for money due on credit sales. The legal
issue concerned whether the state court or the Indian tribal court
had jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court phrased it, "[e]ssentially,
absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 87 As to whether
there was infringement in the case, the Court said, "Itlhere can be
no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here could
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
32. Although the Court mentioned both the commerce and the property clauses, it based
its reasoning on an inherent power in Congress derived from the necessity of placing power to
regulate federal territory somewhere. Similarly an inherent power derived from the obligation
that the government owed these "remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished
in numbers... " Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
33. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
35. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
36. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
37. Id. at 220.
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selves.""8 Because the plaintiff was on the reservation and the trans-
action took place there, the fact that he was a non-Indian was imma-
terial. Thus, Indian sovereignty was used to block an intrusion of
state court power.
The Court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,39 utilized the
principle of sovereignty to support Indian tribal power. The tribe had
entered into long term gas and oil leases with twenty-one companies
and eventually imposed a severance tax on oil and gas production.
Although the tribe was already receiving rents and royalties, the Su-
preme Court upheld the tax stating, "[t]he power to tax is an essen-
tial attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instru-
ment of self-government and territorial management." 40
Conversely, in the third case in the series, Montana v. United
States,41 Indian sovereignty not only lost, but state power won. Both
the state and the tribe had laws regulating hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on land owned by non-Indians located within the reser-
vation. The Supreme Court resolved the overlapping regulations by
concluding that although tribal sovereignty was sufficient to allow
the tribe to regulate its own affairs, the ". . . exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes . -4 The Court, less than a year before its "territo-
rial management" reasoning in Merrion,3 rejected the territorial
component to Indian sovereignty except where "necessary" for tribal
self-protection, or in other words, where the non-tribal activity
"threatens"" or "imperils"" the tribe. With the tribe not permitted
to regulate, the state, which, as found by the district court, had exer-
cised "near exclusive" jurisdiction over the fee lands in question,46
prevailed by default.
The final case in this sovereignty quartet concerned the author-
ity of the tribe to apply its criminal laws to non-Indians on the reser-
vation. The facts in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe47 were
strongly in favor of the tribe. The non-Indians committed their
38. Id. at 223.
39. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
40. Id. at 137.
41. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
42. Id. at 564.
43. See supra text accompanying note 38.
44. 450 U.S. at 566.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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crimes on the reservation, victimizing both tribal members and tribal
police who were on duty trying to keep the peace. Notwithstanding
this abuse of tribal law enforcement officers, the Court found that
sovereignty or "quasi-sovereignty" ' 8 of the Indian tribes did not in-
clude criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians."9 Justice Marshall and
Chief Justice Burger dissented, agreeing with the court of appeals
that the "power to preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine
qua non of . . . sovereignty . . .,,"
These cases illustrate that Indian sovereignty, in the absence of
federal law to the contrary, gives tribes virtually full authority over
tribal members5" on the reservation. Concomitantly, the states are
powerless. Sovereignty, however, as a source of power for the tribes
or a limitation on the states beyond the confluence of the two factors
of tribal Indian and reservation is uncertain.
IV. Preemption
At the same time that the Supreme Court was using sovereignty
to decide state-tribe issues, it was also using preemption. In the 1962
case of Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,52 Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the Court, not only applied preemption to the particular
facts but also tried to expand it to replace the sovereignty analysis.
In Kake the Indians lived in villages outside of the reservation and
made their living fishing. After finding that neither federal treaty
nor federal statute created or protected the Indian fishing rights, the
Court held that the state could regulate Indian fishing pursuant to
its conservation laws. In other words, because federal law did not
preempt, the state was free to govern. Although this was an off-res-
ervation case, Justice Frankfurter implied its relevance to disputes
on the reservation by quoting an earlier Supreme Court case, "[in
the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or Congressional enact-
ment each state had a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reser-
vations within its boundaries." 3 This language, however, from a
48. Id. at 208.
49. At times the opinion reads as if a "policy preemption" approach were being used,
but on the bottom line the decision appears to be based on an inherent limitation in the re-
tained "quasi-sovereignty" power.
50. Id. at 212.
51. In discussing Indians who are not members of the governing tribe, the Court has
taken the view that "[flor most practical purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as
non-Indians on the reservation." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980).
52. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
53. Kake, 369 U.S. at 75 (quoting New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499
(1946).
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1946 case is inconsistent with the Court's 1959 sovereignty analysis
in Williams. " Justice Frankfurter distinguished Williams by stat-
ing that "the factor found decisive" 5 5 in that case was "treaty-pro-
tected reservation self-government." 5  In short, under Justice Frank-
furter's analysis, Williams was to become a preemption case instead
of a sovereignty case. This effort to "preempt sovereignty" through
dicta failed, and Kake became a semi-classic57 illustration of state
power over Indians residing off the reservation.
In 1973, Justice Marshall brought new meaning to preemption
in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission." Here the Court ad-
dressed whether the state could impose its general income tax on a
reservation Indian who earned all of her income on the reservation.
If the reservation Indians were to prevail in this dispute, something
had to change. Although the Williams case, like this one, concerned
the application of state law to an individual Indian rather than the
tribe, the Williams sovereignty approach did not fit as neatly this
time because tribal authority was not implicated. Neither did Kake
legal preemption fit. No federal treaty or law actually prohibited a
state tax in the situation presented. Nevertheless, new doctrine was
formed and the tribal Indians did prevail. Justice Marshall, for the
Court, expanded both sovereignty and preemption into a composite.
Sovereignty was relevant "not because it provides a definitive resolu-
tion of the issues in this suit, [as it did in Williams] but because
[sovereignty doctrine] provides a backdrop against which the appli-
cable treaties and federal statutes must be read."59 To this backdrop
the Court added two ingredients: 1) the familiar canon of both inter-
pretation and construction that "[d]oubtful expressions [in federal
treaties and statutes pertaining to Indians] are to be resolved in
favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the
nation .. "60 and 2) the fact that the Indians are "under general
federal supervision. '"'I Together these three factors coalesced into a
specific limitation on state power. To distinguish legal preemption,
and because the Supreme Court has not provided a descriptive name,
54. See discussion supra text accompanying note 36.
55. Kake, 369 U.S. at 76.
56. Id.
57. It would represent a classic off-reservation exercise of state power but for the fact
that these Indians lived in clusters similar to the rancheria or pueblo; they lived in villages.
The Court chose not to view them as living together in a unit worthy of special protection, and
treated them as if they were simply living separately within the state's jurisdiction.
58. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
59. Id. at 172.
60. Id. at 174 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1960)).
61. Id. at 175.
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this Article will call the new preemption limitation "policy preemp-
tion." McClanahan resembles Kake in that both cases downplay sov-
ereignty and elevate preemption; but beyond the superficial likeness
they are worlds apart. Kake, in both analysis and result favors state
power, whereas McClanahan is pro-Indian.
In 1980, Justice Marshall in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,12 clarified and refined his policy preemption analysis. The
state had tried to apply a license and use tax to a non-Indian enter-
prise operating solely on a reservation. As in McClanahan, the Court
held that policy preemption precluded the state from applying its
taxing power. The Court took the opportunity to distinguish tradi-
tional preemption, that is, legal preemption, from the preemption be-
ing developed for state-Indian cases. The Arizona court had rejected
the preemption argument because the facts did not fit the three-
prong test of Pennsylvania v. Nelson." Justice Marshall responded,
"The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally
unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes
those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of
the law."" He then proceeded to discuss preemption in the same
terms he had used in McClanahan. He did, however, make explicit
what was not clear in McClanahan-that in the preemption formula
"any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be given
weight."6 The ultimate test calls "for a particularized inquiry into
the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an in-
quiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the ex-
ercise of state authority would violate federal law."" Taken at face
value and out of context, this statement supports an open-ended bal-
ancing of relevant interests. In reality, however, the nature of tribal
and federal interests previously identified, makes an inquiry into
state interests merely an afterthought.
In 1982, in the Ramah Navajo School Boarde6 case, Justice
Marshall was successful again in applying policy preemption to pre-
clude a state tax, this time a gross receipts tax imposed on a non-
Indian contractor for construction work done on the reservation in
building an Indian school. In its analysis, the Court observed that
62. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
63. 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The test is to the effect that preemption occurs if congressional
intent to preempt is found, the law by its terms preempts, or Congress has filled or occupied
the field.
64. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
65. Id. at 144.
66. Id. at 145.
67. Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bd. of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
although the "legal incidence"' 8 of the tax was not on the tribe, the
tribe carried the ultimate economic burden. It then focused on two
federal interests: 1) "[t]he comprehensive federal scheme regulating
the creation and maintenance of educational opportunities for Indian
children;" 9 and 2) "[t]he express federal policy of encouraging In-
dian self-sufficiency in the area of education."" ° Against these inter-
ests, the state's interest in obtaining tax revenue from the contractor
in return for state services supplied to him off the reservation
succumbed.
Disagreement with policy preemption analysis was present in
earlier cases and was present here as well. Justice Rehnquist wrote a
dissent which Justices White and Stevens joined. He disagreed with
the majority on two grounds. First, he made it clear that he favored
legal preemption over policy preemption. In his view Indian sover-
eignty was relevant only in ascertaining congressional intent.7 1 Sec-
ond, he considered the majority's use of policy preemption to be er-
roneous because the federal scheme of regulations did not regulate
school construction qua construction; and federal policies favoring
economic self-sufficiency for Indian tribes were not so restrictive as
to foreclose a state from applying a legitimate state tax. 2
The next year, in Rice v. Rehner,"7 the Court applied policy
preemption once again; but this time the voice of Justice O'Connor
was heard, and although the lyrics sounded a little familiar, the revi-
sion of the melody was complete. California had applied its licensing
requirement to a liquor seller who sold liquor on an Indian reserva-
tion for off-premises consumption, even though the seller was both a
tribal Indian and a federally licensed Indian trader.
Justice O'Connor started her analysis by making two prelimi-
nary observations: 1) that the meaning of preemption in the state-
tribe context has "not been static; '7 4 and 2) that "[t]he goal of any
pre-emption inquiry is 'to determine the congressional plan' . . ..
The first observation was innocuous but the second was foreboding
because it tied preemption to law and cited Nelson 7 as authority.
68. Id. at 844 n.8.
69. Id. at 845.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 848 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
72. Id. at 851-52.
73. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
74. Id. at 718.
75. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956)).
76. Nelson is one of the leading cases for legal preemption. See supra note 63 and ac-
companying text.
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With the preliminaries out of the way, the Court swiftly established
its analytic shift and changed its manner of using Indian sovereignty.
Whereas Justice Marshall utilized the general doctrine of Indian
sovereignty as a backdrop, Justice O'Connor focused, instead, on the
specific issue in the case and asked the question, was sovereignty rel-
evant to that specific matter?
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court dissenters were in
essential agreement in their analysis. The lower court thought, ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, that "there was some single notion of
tribal sovereignty that served to direct any preemption analysis in-
volving Indians."" The Supreme Court dissenters made it clear that
the sovereignty "backdrop" analysis has "never turned on whether
the particular area being regulated is one traditionally within the
tribe's control.
' 97 8
On the other hand, the Court majority through Justice
O'Connor discussed the "historical tradition [concerning] the use
and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country . . . 9
The Court found that the tribes were not immune from state regula-
tion of sales to non-Indian buyers80 and not immune from federal
regulation of sales to Indians. Furthermore, Congress had "divested
the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area."" Thus,
because specific sovereign immunity that might have implied sover-
eignty, and specific sovereign power that would have directly sup-
ported sovereignty were both missing, there was no sovereignty back-
drop to inform a preemption analysis. Without sovereignty as a
backdrop, the Court concluded, policy preemption was not an appli-
cable analytic approach. Instead legal preemption was substituted.
Under legal preemption the Court not only found that Congress had
not preempted the state but that Congress had in fact permitted the
state to regulate in this field.
Although Rice may be a pathsetting case, it is doubtful. Not
77. Rice, 463 U.S. at 725.
78. Id. at 739 (Blackman, J. dissenting). Justice Blackman was joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall.
79. Id. at 724.
80. Id. at 720. The authorities cited by the Court do not support its conclusion. The two
cases relied upon, Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) were "taxing" not
"regulatory" or licensing cases. Validation of a tax on a non-Indian buyer does not confirm the
validity of a regulation on an Indian seller. Although in both cases there was an incidental
regulation that the Court upheld, three reasons explain why that will not help the Court: 1)
the regulation was minimal; 2) it was valid only because it was tied to the tax as an adminis-
trative aid to collection; and 3) the majority in Rice, in fact, did not use the regulatory aspect
of the cases.
81. Rice at 724.
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only is it clouded by the sui generis nature of the liquor consumption
problem among the Indians but also by the case of New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe,82 which was argued to the Supreme Court
after the Rice case had been argued, but was decided two weeks
before Rice was handed down.
Mescalero concerned the authority of a state to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing by non-members of an Indian tribe on an Indian res-
ervation. The Court decided against the state. Justice Marshall was
at the helm again, writing, surprisingly, for a unanimous Court.
Given the differing views of the Justices on this subject generally,
unanimity suggests what a reading of the opinion confirms: the opin-
ion is equivocal enough to satisfy everyone. Justice Marshall
achieved this creative goal by apparently altering, at least for this
case, his two primary analytic ideas-sovereignty and federal policy.
Arguably he reduced sovereignty as an independent basis for re-
stricting the application of state law. He did not reject the concept
but reaffirmed it tepidly in a brief footnote. Merrion-a strong sov-
ereignty opinion-he discussed, remarkably, as if it were a policy
preemption case. Together, the footnote and the Merrion analysis
could serve as the first step in an attempt to rewrite the sovereignty
line of cases by changing their rationale if not their result. A second
modification of sovereignty was Justice Marshall's move away from
the general backdrop analysis in favor of a narrower focus on sover-
eignty as applied to the specific facts at hand. Similarly, he altered
his view toward the use of federal policy. Instead of relying on a
broad federal policy based on responsibility for supervision of the
Indians or responsibility for making them self-sufficient, he empha-
sized the federal policy relating to the specific matter before the
Court. Summarily, in lieu of an analysis based on the general, one
was substituted based on the specific.
Rice and Mescalero can be easily reconciled. Where the speci-
ficity regarding both sovereignty and federal policy is clear, the una-
nimity of Mescalero can be expected; but where it is not, the Court
split will presumably recur.83 Whether the majority will continue to
follow Justice Marshall or realign itself for an analytic journey with
Justice O'Connor is a question that will have to await further
litigation.
The 1987 decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
82. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
83. This is so unless the Marshall majority have given up the general analysis for the
specific, which is unlikely.
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Indians4 offers a suggestion of the direction the Court will take. The
case involved a tribe's challenge to the application of county ordi-
nances and California statutes regulating bingo games to the tribe's
commercial bingo operations. The Court affirmed an injunction
which had been entered on a summary judgment for the tribe. Jus-
tice White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 Court. Justice Marshall
was with the majority; Justice O'Connor joined the dissent. With a
new Justice at the helm, a new analysis might have been expected.
In fact, however, the opinion reads like Mescalero, but applied to a
factual context less clearly pro-Indian than that of Mescalero. The
approach of the Court is a blend of the general "traditional notions
of Indian sovereignty" and "the congressional goal . . of encourag-
ing tribal self-sufficiency and economic development" 5 with the spe-
cific Department of the Interior interest in "promoting tribal bingo
enterprises."8 6
V. Discussion
Notwithstanding the passage of many years and the efforts of
several Supreme Court Justices, the state-Indian conflict of laws sit-
uation remains, as we have seen, intractable. The recent evolution of
policy preemption and its response are a recognition that neither sov-
ereignty nor legal preemption is an adequate answer.
Sovereignty analysis superficially tends to be too strongly pro-
Indian. Further, as a source of tribal authority it is today an anach-
ronism that sends false messages of high hopes to tribal Indians. Fi-
nally, it often does not solve the pending problem."7
At the other extreme is legal preemption. It is too strongly pro-
state. Notwithstanding the mountain of laws passed by Congress af-
84. 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987).
85. Id. at 1092.
86. Id. The state's countervailing interest in preventing an infiltration by organized
crime was not weighty enough to "escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests
.. .d. at 1094.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Among the argu-
ments made, the dissent tried to equate the fact situation with that in Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in which Justice White,
writing for the majority, allowed the state to intrude on Indian power because the tribe was
trying to "market an exemption," id. at 155, from the state's tax. Justice White's attempt to
distinguish his opinion in Cabazon from his opinion in Confederated Tribes did not convince
the dissenting Justices, who thought the tribe was trying to market a regulatory exemption.
Cabazon, at 1096-97.
Additionally, the dissenting Justices thought that the state's interest was legitimate and
should not be eclipsed by federal administrative or judicial decision-making; only congressional
action, the dissent maintained, should have such force.
87. See infra text p. 13-17.
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fecting Indians, they do not either by their legislative intent, their
express language, or by their occupying the field begin to resolve the
countless issues still arising between state governments and tribal au-
thorities. For the Court to hand these issues to the states simply be-
cause of congressional silence, is to abdicate responsibility toward
the Indians-a responsibility that has long been accepted not just by
Congress and the President, but by the Supreme Court as well.
Thus, the pressure on the Court to find a middle position is real.
Several possibilities can be identified. The broad policy preemption
formula, like sovereignty, is probably too Indian-oriented. Once an
ambiguity is established between state and tribe, the result is known:
the tribe wins. This is so because, once the backdrop of sovereignty,
the relevant general federal policy, and the maxim of interpretation
are taken together, the direction is inexorably toward the Indians.
Even Justice Marshall's recent modification in Bracker,88 in which
the interest of the state was clearly made a relevant factor, only soft-
ens the onesidedness; it does not change the inevitable result.
The Rice analysis in both its direction and scope seems to be too
pro-state because it is basically a sovereignty analysis in reverse. If
the particular subject matter is not within the realm of Indian sover-
eignty, the state wins unless the tribe is saved by legal preemption.
Exclusion from the realm appears to include matters that fall within
several categories: 1) exclusion because of tradition, history or cus-
tom; 2) exclusion based on inaction; 3) exclusion by federal law; and
4) exclusion through non-immunity. Viewed cynically, this means
the Indians can do what they have been able to get away with thus
far but no more.
The latest effort by the Court, exemplified by Mescalero and
Cabazon, is a modified policy preemption approach. To the general
variables of policy preemption is added the factor of specific current
federal law or policy.
Alternatively the Court could approach state-Indian issues the
way it does many state-state conflicts; that is, by leaving them alone
for the most part to be resolved under an evolutionary course worked
out by the parties and the lower courts.89 This, of course, does not
directly solve anything, but rather simply shifts responsibility. Theo-
retically, however, to the extent that it encourages the states and the
88. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
89. As one commentator has put it, "It]he Court's retreat from ... attempts to impose
strict constitutional limitations on choice of law has eased the way for the new 'functional' and
'state-interest' choice-of-law approaches. ... R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 495 (2d ed. 1980).
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tribes to work out solutions cooperatively and arrive at legal accom-
modations, this approach has some merit. This is especially true in
light of the fact that unlike states, Indian tribes are not fungible,
either factually or legally."'
Recently, the Court decided a case which could act as a base
for developing this alternative. In National Farmer's Union Insur-
ance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,91 the Crow tribal court entered a
judgment against a non-Indian because of an incident occurring on
the reservation, but on state-owned land. The defendant challenged
the jurisdiction of the tribal court by seeking an injunction in federal
court. In a unanimous decision, the Court agreed that whether the
tribal court had jurisdiction was a federal question within the au-
thority of the federal court. Nevertheless, they concluded that the
injunction should be withheld until tribal court remedies had been
exhausted.
The opinion is fairly brief and does not expand on the issues
presented." Nevertheless, Crow Tribe can be read as encouraging
not only states but also tribes to develop their judicial systems so
that they can reasonably resolve both jurisdictional disputes and
choice of law problems relating to state-Indian affairs. The question
then arises; what is a federal district court to do if later a dissatisfied
party invokes its jurisdiction to resolve the federal issue? One answer
is that it would decide the issue de novo. The advantage of this type
of abstention is that over time the two jurisdictions may work out
90. Leaving aside treaty and statute interpretation cases, the Supreme Court has not
made much of tribal differences. In some federal statutes, a "federally recognized" quality is
needed for a tribe to qualify for federal administrative aid. "Federal recognition" is given by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In the cases and context of this Article, however, this quality
seems to be irrelevant.
91. 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985).
92. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Crow Tribe position in Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). After a tribal court had denied a motion to
dismiss a civil suit for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant insurer, without seeking review by the
tribal court of appeals, attempted to invoke the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of a federal
district court. The defendant sought a declaration that it was not bound to defend its insured
(also a defendant in the civil action) because the injuries of which the plaintiff complained
were not covered within the terms of the applicable insurance policies. The district court dis-
missed the suit for declaratory judgment on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, and the court of
appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
Although petitioner alleges that federal jurisdiction in this case is based on
diversity of citizenship, rather than the existence of a federal question, the ex-
haustion rule announced in [Crow Tribe] applies here as well. Regardless of the
basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs
a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the Tribal Court a "full opportu-
nity to determine its own jurisdiction."
Id. at 976-77. The Court held that, at a minimum, the tribal appellate courts must have an
opportunity to review the decisions of the lower tribal courts.
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their problems making federal court involvement unnecessary. Until
then, however, abstention may result in wasted time and money
before the meaningful decision-maker, the federal court, is permitted
to act. Another answer is to limit the authority of the district court.
Following the lead of the Congress in the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act, 93 the Court could provide a limited federal remedy that is com-
parable to habeas corpus.94 In other words, the federal court's role
would be to review the decision made by the state or tribal court
system to make sure that good faith was exercised, fair procedures
used, all relevant arguments considered, and, on the merits, a rea-
sonable result reached. This approach would reduce the involvement
of both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts and would
place responsibility on the states and the tribes. It would also allow
for a customized solution depending on the particular tribe instead of
a single rule applicable to all tribes. This approach, however, does
have serious shortcomings. Cooperation may not be the result. In-
stead, a race to the jurisdictional courthouse may occur with the
winning jurisdiction flaunting its own interests. If federal review is
limited, self-interest, clothed in reasonableness, may prevail too
often; federal judicial responsibility will have been abdicated in a
manner similar to the abdication under legal preemption.9"
A final alternative to be considered consists of a composite of
several changes. First, the Court could accept the idea that in the
absence of congressional law to the contrary, the tribes have gov-
erning authority over their territories whether aboriginal, reserva-
tion, or some other form. This conclusion, however, would not be
based on sovereignty. The Court's current philosophy toward that
concept seems sensible; that is, to acknowledge that although the
scope of tribal authority may still be based on the concept of sover-
eignty, the source of the authority is no longer actual sovereignty. 96
Today if a tribe exercises sovereign power, it is because of federal
permission. Federal power governs. Second, preemption language as
part of any policy analysis should be dropped. Giving the tribes
93. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
94. The only remedy provided for in the Indian Civil Rights Act is habeas corpus. Id. at
§ 1303.
95. The Court in its recent LaPlante sequel to Crow Tribe did not clarify the role of the
federal judiciary.
96. If sovereignty inherent in the tribes is frankly abolished and sovereignty by grant of
federal law is the only sovereignty available, then it might be difficult to maintain the idea that
the scope of the power is still tied to the original notion of sovereignty. The scope should be
determined by reference to federal law just as the source is. This creates problems for issues
such as double jeopardy and governmental immunity.
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power over their territories does not ipso facto address state-Indian
conflict issues and the question of whether an event is subject to tri-
bal or state law depends on important variables related to that
event.97 This leads to the third change. Under both sovereignty and
policy preemption analyses, the Court has not been particularly at-
tentive to the interests of the states. Even in the recent policy pre-
emption formulations, the acknowledgement of the state interest fac-
tor does not clarify what its real significance will be. Given that most
of the thorny state-tribe problems occur on Indian land, a tribe's ba-
sic interest is apparent; so is a state's lack of interest. Why the dis-
pute, then? Because the territorial dimension, although sometimes
definitive, does not always solve the problem. It is often only the
beginning.
There are several classes of situations that illustrate the di-
lemma. One is the on-reservation/off-reservation fact pattern. Mi-
gratory fish and game are classic examples because they naturally
move between tribal and state territory.98 In instances when they do,
they present a dual jurisdiction problem even though at any given
time they may be in only one jurisdiction. Similarly, industrial pollu-
tion which travels from a plant located off-reservation into reserva-
tion territory is a more modern variety of the dual jurisdiction prob-
lem.99 Although the Court has recognized the reality, it has not
always openly confronted the two-jurisdiction feature in its analysis.
A second type of recurring fact situation is the portable one; it
may have a situs in only one jurisdiction at a time but it may move
around from place to place. Certain issues in family law are of this
type. 0
0
A third type of problem falls under the rubric of concurrent
jurisdiction. Taxation, in contrast to regulation, is often seen in this
way. 1 1 Procedurally, too, many kinds of issues are often subject to
the courts of more than one jurisdiction. 02 In the Indian law context
itself, the question of whether the state or federal courts should have
jurisdiction to decide the sensitive matter of allocating scarce water
97. If the state interest is to have some bite and is considered to be part of the test, then
it seems a misnomer to continue calling the approach preemption. If the state interest is con-
sidered outside the test, then to say that federal preemption can, at time, be defeated by a
state interest is still an odd way with the language.
98. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443
U.S. 658 (1979); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
99. See, e.g, UNC Resources v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.M. 1981).
100. See, e.g., State ex rel. Flammond v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471 (1980).
101. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
102. See, e.g., Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987).
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resources among Indian tribes and the western states has been an-
swered by the Court in terms of concurrent jurisdiction."' 3 State
courts are allowed to act even though the law to be applied concern-
ing tribal water claims is federal and not state. The language in Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion in Colorado River that "Indian interests may
be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law .. "104 is
precedent for granting concurrent jurisdiction to state courts in a
variety of situations in which the substantive issues are important to
the tribes and where federal or tribal substantive law may be
applicable.
A fourth type of case concerns land areas that although situated
within Indian land boundaries may be owned by another sovereign.
This category includes state enclaves such as public schools and state
highways. When fact patterns create situations that impinge on more
than one jurisdiction, a frank acknowledgement of the conflict cou-
pled with an evaluation of state, tribe and other interests would seem
to point toward a sensible result.
Is the final alternative suggested above an improvement over the
approaches currently in use by the Court for resolving state-tribe le-
gal disputes? The answers to three questions may be helpful. First,
how would the key cases discussed in this Article have fared under
it? Among the cases discussed under the sovereignty rubric, Wil-
liams might have gone the opposite way; that is, allowing the state
to have judicial jurisdiction over the debt collection. Due process and
choice of substantive law would have remained at issue. Montana,
which allowed state regulation over hunting by non-Indians on non-
Indian land located on the reservation, might have gone either way.
If the only reason for disallowing tribal governance was the major-
ity's decision to deny the tribe authority to manage its own territory
except in emergencies, then a change to allowing territorial manage-
ment by the tribe would have reversed the result. If, however, the
basis for the decision also included a consideration of the state's in-
terests, then the result under the alternative would have depended on
the consideration of both tribal and state interests with the under-
standing that the particular interest inherent in the idea of territori-
ality belongs to the tribe. Oliphant, which flatly denied the tribe's
power to apply its criminal laws to non-Indians on the reservation in
favor of the situs state, would have gone the other way. Territoriality
103. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
104. Id. at 812.
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alone would have given the Indians a first claim to jurisdiction. Any
state interest seems doubtful. Why, for example, should a state in
which an Indian reservation sits have criminal jurisdiction over a
non-Indian from another state? If the tribe has the interest in terri-
toriality and the non-Indian's home state has an interest in his per-
son, what interest does the prosecuting state have? 105
Among the preemption cases, McClanahan, Bracker, and
Ramah - all could have gone to the states. Unless a discriminatory
or confiscatory tax or some other due process or equal protection vio-
lation is found, the principle of concurrent power should prevail. The
Rice case concerned the licensing of liquor sales on the reservation.
Although the state may have an interest based both on loss of reve-
nue on sales made to residents of the state who purchase on the res-
ervation and on the effects liquor consumption from on-reservation
sales might have on activities within the state, it is questionable
whether these interests are strong enough to overcome the tribe's in-
terests. The claim of lost revenue may not even be valid,106 and the
safety factor could be controlled more directly and efficiently by
reaching the buyer-consumer's unsafe behavior within the state. As
for Mescalero and Cabazon - they would have been decided the
same way.
The second question is whether the suggested alternative would
make decision-making any easier? One advantage is that it elimi-
nates ad hoc decisions concerning the question of whether the tribe's
authority extends beyond tribal members and includes territorial
management. A second advantage is that it eliminates not only the
word preemption, but more importantly the open, free-wheeling in-
quiry allowed by policy preemption. Federal policy inquiry under
this alternative would have been already channeled to a great extent
into the decision to grant the tribes territoriality. Thirdly, with both
territoriality and preemption put to rest, an inquiry into the legiti-
105. The Court's sensitivity to the problem of having non-Indians tried by the tribes
pursuant to Indian jurisprudence, which may differ radically in some instances, is commenda-
ble. Instead of resolving the issue in favor of the tribes and leaving any corrective measures to
Congress, the Court chose to deprive the tribes of the power. Congress can act if it chooses.
The result is particularly hard given the nature of crimes in the case. One defendant was
charged with "assaulting a tribal officer" and the other with "recklessly endangering another
person" and "injuring tribal property." The latter defendant engaged in a high speed auto race
that ended with a collision with a tribal police car. The tribes had a strong claim to the power
to enforce their criminal laws against any offender who violates crimes that relate to what has
been called "order maintenance." The Court, however, made no distinctions among crimes.
106. As the Court stated in another related context, "Thus, a State seeking to impose a
tax on a transaction between a Tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general
interest in raising revenues." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336
(1983).
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mate interests of the competing jurisdictions can be had.
The third question concerning the wisdom of the alternative
analysis is whether legitimate interests, other than those of the state
and the tribe, would be injured by its use? At least three come to
mind. One interest that may be injured is federal policy not covered
by the territorial principle or by current federal law. For example,
territoriality would give to the Indians power to regulate liquor sales
absent federal law to the contrary. May not federal policy speak
against this result? Perhaps, but if so, the sensible solution is for
Congress to transform the policy into law.
A second interest superficially devastated by the alternative ap-
proach is the Indian's inherent right to sovereignty. The fact is, how-
ever, that Kagama terminated this right, rightly or wrongly, long
ago. It is not the fact of inherent sovereignty but the scope of per-
mitted sovereignty that is worth fighting for. 107 The alternative does
not impair this.
Finally, the interest of non-Indians on the reservation to be gov-
erned by familiar law rather than by the law of a strange culture is
undercut by the territorial principle. The problem is not so much the
application of foreign law as its unanticipated application. Because
constitutional due process notice requirements are not applicable to
tribal government, Congress has the responsibility to fill the void. It
has carried out this obligation by legislating a due process mandate
on the tribes.108 Certain interpretational and jurisdictional issues,
however, remain open.109 In reality, the problem does not appear to
be serious. Not one recent case comes to mind where an individual
was "railroaded" by tribal law. The challenge to Indian law has
come from persons who knew they were on Indian land and subject
to Indian law. Persons who live on a reservation, who operate a retail
store there, or who hunt and fish there can hardly claim surprise.
Nevertheless, the theoretical problem remains.
The purpose of this Article has been to identify and clarify con-
flict of power issues between states and Indian tribes as seen and
resolved by the United States Supreme Court, and further, to sug-
gest and discuss alternatives to current approaches. In the final anal-
ysis, specific suggestions have been made that the Supreme Court
should let the tribes govern their territories, avoid policy preemption
107. But see comments supra notes 31 and 96.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
109. The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) held that en-
forcement of due process was for the tribal courts with no federal court review. Congress had
only allowed for a habeas corpus remedy.
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language and thought, and introduce and develop a functional, state-
tribe interest perspective.

